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The philosophical hermeneutics of German phenomenologist Hans-Georg Gadamer 
(1900-2002) is rarely cited in journalism studies, although it is better known in the 
fields of history, literary study and classical philology. I would like to suggest here 
that journalism studies can make fruitful use of the philosophical concepts he 
developed, in particular to use those idea to bring journalism’s interpretative work to 
the fore in critical enquiry. In the course of introducing some of his ideas, I emphasise 
implications for studying the practical knowledge of the journalist, the dichotomy 
between objective and subjective reporting, and neglected aspects of journalism 
ethics. 
 
One of the rallying cries of journalism studies is that the journalists’ practice cannot 
be adequately critiqued without an understanding of its practitioners’ perspectives. 
However, integrating the views of journalists into a theory of journalism is difficult, 
not least because of a general lack of enthusiasm among even reflective journalists to 
revise their profession’s epistemological claims. As former Chicago Tribune editor 
and publisher Jack Fuller notes, the suspicion of theory means ‘that some of the most 
restless and interesting journalists have had trouble making any claim to truth at all’ 
(Fuller 1996: 5). Yet to fill this gap in self-theorising by treating the way journalism 
knows the world as a sub-set of other forms of knowledge – enduring narratives (Lule 
2001), for example, or dominant ideologies – is rather reductive, for there is a 
widespread ethical commitment among journalists to notions such as ‘telling it like it 
is’ and ‘telling truth to power’. It is, then, difficult to pin down the knowledge 
production practices of journalism. 
 
This paper suggests that the conceptual problem can be eased by drawing upon 
alternative ways of thinking about knowledge which might have greater purchase 
upon journalism practice. Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, which 
was in the broadest sense an attempt to revalue the forms of knowledge of the 
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humanities (Geisteswissenschaften) against the dominance of scientific knowledges, 
may provide some help. Gadamer rejected the dominance of scientific epistemologies, 
including the dichotomy between objective knowledge and lived experience, which 
had marginalised that which did not fit, such as art, to merely aesthetic or private 
value. Following his mentor Heidegger’s lead, he thought of the human condition as 
fundamentally one of ontological insecurity: we are born with no certainties other 
than that we will die. In that state, the drive to understand is a basic aspect of being 
alive, a state that leads not to final knowledge but to constant revision of 
understanding. As one interpreter of Gadamer puts it, ‘We strive to understand 
because, at a basic level, we do not fully understand at all’ (Grondin 1999: 224). In 
Gadamer’s thinking, understanding becomes inseparable from being, a matter of 
being awake to what is out ‘there’ beyond ourselves. ‘To have knowledge, in this 
sense,’ Grondin writes elsewhere, ‘is less to have knowledge of this or that, with the 
goal of mastery which remains objectivizing, but to be there, “in” the meaning which 
challenges us’ (Grondin 2003: 96). 
 
This sensitivity to the irreducible thereness and nowness of the world for us, as well 
as the wide-awake quality of the good observer of the world, finds echoes in 
journalism. Yet these are qualities that are easily neglected in journalism critique 
which lets itself be framed by the practice’s scientistic language of objectivity, 
mirroring the world and verification. As I was preparing this paper, BBC radio 
broadcast a report by its Middle East correspondent, Tim Franks, that illustrates what 
can be left out in such a critical frame. The story, a colour piece about the plight of 
two prominent Iraqi Jewish musicians who fled to Israel in 1951, only to be relegated 
to playing at bar mitzvahs in Tel Aviv while they were erased from the national 
culture at home, was rich in material about the inter-ethnic prejudice fanned by the 
post-war rise of racialising nationalism in both countries (Franks 2009). While the 
news hook for discussing the al-Kuwaiti brothers was controversy over the decision to 
rename a street after them, the story’s news value was clearly about the enormous task 
of reconciliation in the region. Yet that was nowhere made explicit by the reporter – 
there is no statement in the text of what this family’s story means. Instead, Franks 
gives finely observed detail about the family, and allows the material, in a common 
journalistic manoeuvre, to resonate with wider significance. How Franks knows this 
material, and what meanings about Israel he is privileging in his account, remain 
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somewhat opaque. He could be accused of failing to verify his facts or attribute these 
meanings to various sides of the issue – that is, of failing to signal his position outside 
any ideological position. 
 
I was, however, struck by the power of the simple story and would argue that the 
journalist’s work here needs to be partly revalued. Instead of emphasising how the 
journalist knows the world, there is value in also asking how a world comes to view 
through the reporter’s work. Franks’ piece can be re-read, then, as recounting some of 
the experience of the foreign correspondent as he sees particular tensions unfold 
before him. In drawing upon this common form of reportage, the correspondent 
invites the listener to experience those same facts. The lack of overt interpretation 
allows the listener to encounter these people less as symbols of something larger or as 
instances of a wider narrative, than as specific people in a concrete world. In the 
encounter, an interpretative space is opened up in which wider questions about 
Israel’s fraught identity and position become available. The questions specific 
listeners ask are likely to be different – as the widely varying comments from British, 
Saudis, Israelis and others on the BBC story’s online version attest. In other words, an 
approach that looks for the ontological grounds of meaning-making can augment our 
theoretical resources for understanding journalists’ encounters with the world and 
their textual practices. 
 
Discussing these ideas is all the more relevant because forms of journalism which 
work in modes outside the ‘he said-she said’ genres of ostensibly objective hard news 
reporting are in the ascendant. Hannerz describes the rise of a ‘cosmopolitan 
journalism’ replacing the hard international news reporting of the Cold War, which he 
suggests works to develop among publics a ‘feeling of being to some degree at home 
in the world’ (Hannerz 2004: 33). Other observers note the centrality of liveness to 
television news since the 1990s, in which the experience of being at the scene of the 
news event eclipses packaged reports of what happened (PEJ 2005, Cottle 2006). 
Citizen journalism and other forms of amateur media enabled by digital media have 
burst onto the scene since about 2001, alongside a greater use within mainstream 
journalism of subjective forms, all of which invite the reader to experience some kind 
of co-presence with witnesses to public events (Allan 2006). As the sense of living in 
a mediated world has taken hold in contemporary society, many critics (e.g. Couldry 
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2003, Ekström & Johansson 2008) have begun to describe political journalism less as 
a messenger to the public than as a stage upon which political life is carried out before 
the public. Disparate though they are, common to these kinds of developments is a 
shift away from the ‘high modernist’, in Hallin’s (1992) phrase, record of facts to 
more experiential and interpretative forms of reporting. In particular, Barnhurst and 
Mutz (1997) argue US journalism has undergone a long-term shift away from factual 
reporting of events towards accounts of responses to events. As others (e.g. Allan 
2004: 210ff) have shown, accompanying these changes has been a growing 
dissatisfaction with theoretical accounts that regard these forms as of lesser quality or 
value. 
 
A two-minute introduction to Gadamer 
Gadamer’s emphasis on the interconnectedness of the concepts of truth and 
understanding has, I argue, some value for the study of these aspects of journalistic 
knowledge which do not fit dominant modernising scientific models. The discussion 
below focuses on three aspects of his thinking: his restoration to prominence of 
Aristotle’s notion of phronesis, or practical wisdom; the value he placed on 
interpretation as a form of truth-telling; and his emphasis on interpretation, listening 
and other aspects of hermeneutic engagement with the world as moral acts. 
Gadamer’s value to theorists of journalism begins with his embrace of the idea of 
truth – a term that Zelizer (2004) reminds us is one of Anglo-American journalism’s 
‘God-terms’. Indeed Gadamer’s major work is called Truth and Method (Wahrheit 
und Methode) (1979). Yet truth is different here – it is not some empirically verifiable 
object. For Gadamer, truth emerges in fullness of understanding being made manifest, 
which he refers to somewhat enigmatically as the holding of what is said ‘together 
with an infinity of what is not said in one unified meaning’ (ibid: 469). Truth 
becomes, for many readers of Gadamer, a synonym for understanding at its best (e.g. 
Bain-Selbo 2002), in which the horizons of the interpreter and the interpreted are 
fused for a moment. Thinking of journalism as, at its best, a public fusing of horizons 
of understanding might enrich some of our normative theories. 
 
To make sense of such statements, a brief account of Gadamer’s theory of 
interpretation is needed. Following Heidegger, and in common with many other 
hermeneutic theorists, Gadamer proposes that understanding is circular. All 
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understanding begins with prejudgements (Vorurteile, literally prejudices) by which 
the object is first grasped as something to be understood. Without such 
preconceptions, we would not be interested in engaging with an object and would not 
be able to comprehend it or anticipate its position within a larger idea or event. 
Following this, engagement with the object begins to have an impact upon us – our 
prejudgements may either be confirmed or challenged – which leads us to look upon 
the world in a slightly different light. As many commentators note, this circle of 
understanding is theorised not as a vicious one by which prejudice reinscribes itself, 
but as a necessary part of making sense in which we project fore-knowledge onto the 
world in order to begin to understand it. Ricoeur, beginning from the model of the 
sentence, argues that each word is interpreted in a circular movement between its own 
meaning and its meaning as part of the clause or sentence, which he terms ‘the prior 
supposition of a certain kind of whole’ (Ricoeur 1981: 211, see also Edgar 1992: 
113). For Gadamer, understanding at its best – which we might call ‘true 
understanding’ – involves a reflexivity, whereby prejudgements are always available 
to be challenged. Invoking the image of the horizon, he talks of the interpreter 
allowing her or his horizon to be changed by the encounter with the world. In a phrase 
he used repeatedly, to approach truth is to believe that the other may be right. He 
writes of ‘recognizing in advance the possibility that your partner is right, even 
recognizing the possible superiority of your partner’ (Gadamer 1997: 36, see also 
Wiercinski 2009). 
 
The divergence from dominant scientific methods of approaching truth is significant. 
Gadamer accused science – although he acknowledged diversity within it – of an 
historic prejudice against prejudices, which carried the grave risk that it would be 
shaped by ignored prejudices. Thus, rather than separating the observer and the 
observed, his phenomenological approach sought to place the observer as part, for a 
moment, of the thing being understood. He talks at various points of ‘participation in 
understanding’, of the individual being ‘in play’ in a moment of understanding that 
extends between the individual and the object, in the same way as players lose their 
separateness when they are part of a game. In that moment of participation, the 
horizons of the interpreter and that which is being interpreted become fused, so that 
what the other ‘truly means to me’ becomes understood. 
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In literary theory, Gadamer’s writings have been used to theorise the relationship of 
author and reader/critic, allowing for a finer position between authorial authority over 
meaning and the rejection of that authority. While the reader’s intention must always 
be to understand the text, that intention is necessarily shaped by the reader’s position 
in the present. The reading is an experience of the text’s meaning, emphasised 
Wolfgang Iser, a student of Gadamer’s and the founder of reader-response theory 
(Iser 1978). Some analysts of media reception, such as Wilson and Thang (2007), 
have drawn upon Gadamer to explore how individuals project their own ‘fore-
knowledge’ onto media objects in their interaction with them (such as when using the 
web). Other media researchers, particularly in Nordic and German-speaking countries 
(e.g. Dahlgren 1980) have a long tradition of grounding textual analysis in a range of 
hermeneutic principles. In historical studies, Gadamer’s focus on the ‘betweenness’ of 
the interpreter, not part of the historical object but at the same time connected to it 
through all that has already been said about it, has been influential. That is, the 
‘historical consciousness’ of the historian is itself a product of the history being 
studied. Gadamer has also been widely cited in areas as diverse as game theory and 
the exegesis of religious texts, all in the context of shifting away from any sense of 
final interpretation, instead locating the deepest profundity of understanding in the 
experience of coming close to what others truly mean. 
 
In the study of journalism, analysis of how journalists interpret has tended to be 
marginalised in favour of more epistemologically grounded questions of how 
journalists know what they know. Thus Ekström’s (2002) rich analysis of television 
journalism’s ‘knowledge-producing practices’ deals mostly with justifications, logics 
and rules that undergird journalism’s sense of itself. Even phenomenologically-
informed approaches to journalism practice, such as the classic ethnographies of 
Tuchman (1978) and Fishman (1980), tend to emphasise news practices, such as the 
casting of a ‘news net’ upon the world in order to comprehend it, and typifying as 
news only that which falls into the net, as techniques of knowing, rather than as 
modes of being. Indeed, in a logic that risks being a (vicious) circle, the identification 
of these journalistic techniques to manage newsgathering becomes a critique of the 
rigidity of newsgathering (a point I return to shortly). There is clearly room for a 
range of approaches, but Gadamer helps us ask what is missed when the journalistic 
understanding of the world is framed in these terms. 
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Holistic understanding and common sense 
Gadamer, in seeking to rehabilitate the humanities, draws upon Aristotle’s notion of 
phronesis, or the practical knowledge of what is right that is embedded in action and 
daily life. Unlike theoretical knowledge of what is right or technical knowledge of 
how to achieve something, phronetic knowledge is envisaged not as a method or set 
of rules, but as a capacity, as something we do. As such, it includes both affective and 
instinctive responses. Gadamer cites Aristotle’s example of archery, where rules of 
how to take aim must be supplemented by learning how to hold the bow and get a feel 
for the task (Gadamer 1979: 134). He himself uses the example of a judge, whose 
relationship to law is not one of knowing law in the abstract as much as doing it in the 
here and now. The law needs to be interpreted in terms of what it means for the 
present case being considered. 
 
This kind of understanding is holistic; that is, like Ricoeur’s reader of the sentence, it 
involves the individual engaging with the whole of his or her being with the whole of 
the object, in the present context. Edgar (1992), one of the few scholars to relate 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics to journalism, gives the example of a hurricane story. When 
the journalist hears of a hurricane, his or her ‘initial decision to attend to the event 
will rest upon the anticipation of the place of that event in a broader whole’ (ibid: 
117). In one dimension, that broader whole is the bigger category of storm events. In 
another, it is the journalistic category of weather stories, with their dramatic visuals 
and opportunities for live reporting. In another, it is the journalist’s awareness of other 
stories happening at the time, which may or may not be regarded as more worthy of 
coverage. Edgar uses the point in his argument against the possibilities of any 
objective account of the hurricane. ‘As with all interpretation, a news report does not 
grasp the event definitively, but within a given horizon’ (ibid: 118). The example also 
suggests, however, that from the very first moment that the journalist encounters a 
possible story – in fact, in order for the journalist to encounter the ‘occurrence’ at all 
as a news ‘event’, in Tuchman’s (1978) phrasing – a large array of preconceptions is 
deployed. Seeing is from the very first moment an act of understanding, or at least an 
anticipation of what the object being seen could mean. 
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Seen in this light, the difficulties that journalists often have in justifying their news 
decisions in terms other than a ‘nose for news’ or a generalised sense of the public 
interest may be less a failure in self-knowledge, than a reliance upon a different kind 
of knowledge. To say this does not remove journalism from criticism for the 
dominance of certain forms of news, but it takes us closer to understanding how and 
why certain forms of news are reported so often. Glasser and Ettema (1989) make just 
this point, arguing that scholars need to pay closer attention to journalists’ accounts of 
how novice reporters learn from the ‘wisdom’ of their seniors in recognising news 
stories within the stream of potential news. Drawing upon Geertz’s description of 
common sense as practical, immethodical and natural, they argue that a similar 
knowledge exists among journalists of ‘how a story can go’. Certain kinds of material 
can be recognised as capable of being transformed into certain types of story. What 
rubs off from experienced peers, Glasser and Ettema argue, is ‘not so much the tricks 
of the trade or even an elder’s proverbs but rather a style of thought – attuned not only 
to the profession’s traditions and practices but to the heritage of one’s culture’ (ibid: 
24). A hermeneutic account can go further, proposing that what novice journalists are 
developing is their version of the newsroom’s horizon of understanding, a sense of the 
whole story or whole news practice in terms of which particular statements and events 
will make sense to them as news. The stories which journalists tell each other (Zelizer 
1993) and the recognition of prior stories in new ones (Kitzinger 2000) are all part of 
this developing awareness of the world. A Gadamerian might also want to ask 
whether the newsroom environment is indeed as homogenising as the more structural 
accounts of news practice suggest (see Ericson et al. 1987: 26). Is it possible that the 
horizon of how a story can go is a more context- dependent, flexible thing than we are 
used to imagining? 
 
Beyond the subjective-objective split 
Gadamer places language at the heart of understanding. In one of his most famous 
statements, he proposes that, ‘Being that can be understood is language’ (Gadamer 
1979: 432). All that part of experience which can be grasped between people – that is, 
understood – takes place in language. A world, a being here and now, becomes 
graspable when an individual places her or himself in relation to others through 
words. One of the major consequences of this thread of thinking is that neither the 
interpreter not the interpreted can be given theoretical priority. As already noted, 
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Gadamer thinks of the interpreter as part of the meaning of what is being read, and 
rejects out of hand the notion of an objective knowledge. How, he asks, can it make 
sense to put ourselves in brackets if we wish to understand what is right? He talks in a 
number of places of understanding as a dialogue, in which any utterance is always a 
reply to a previous one, that is, it always presupposes previous statements and 
understandings, and always followed by a response. In both these images, the 
individual recedes from view. ‘Those who take part in dialogue are not so much 
participants as those in whom the dialogue participates’ (Gadamer 1979: 1). As 
Wright (1998) notes, Gadamer, in moving beyond objectivist accounts, carefully 
grounds understanding not in subjectivity but in language and dialogue. 
 
This sense of a space between people builds usefully on other dialogic theories, such 
as Voloshinov’s or Habermas’s, which emphasise the relational as the basis of 
knowledge construction. What strikes me as distinctive and also of particular value in 
studying journalism practice is Gadamer’s insistence on that space as the outcome of 
the interpreter’s search for what the object of attention truly means to that interpreter, 
and his willingness to regard that outcome as a kind of truth. For, while objectivity 
has never achieved a particularly close fit with journalism, remaining something of a 
self-deception or at best an aspiration, as so many scholars have attested, the 
underlying ethical commitment expressed within journalism practice to a truth that is 
out there in the world, and that is more than the journalist’s personal understanding, 
cannot be simply ignored. Journalism is a truth-telling discourse, however inadequate 
many of its own theoretical justifications are for that status. What Gadamer perhaps 
offers journalism, as much as journalism scholarship, is another way of describing the 
endeavour to approach truth. Gadamer imagines the ‘rightness’ of understanding as a 
momentary fusing of horizons, during which the object is allowed to speak to the 
observer, just as when the voice of the original author is allowed to speak in a good 
translation. Perhaps aspects of good journalism and aspects of a journalistic ideal can 
be described similarly: something of the truth of public events is heard when the 
reporter brings an array of facts and voices together for a moment in a way that allows 
a unity and coherence of meaning to be perceived, yet ready to revise or even 




Any hermeneutic theory that can be drawn out of Gadamer’s writings must have a 
strong ethical valuation of understanding. Practical knowledge of the world is, for 
both Aristotle and Gadamer, an ethical endeavour, in which good ends are sought. 
Understanding is about a fullness of interpretation, a moment of being which 
approaches what the other truly means to one. Truth and understanding are intimately 
interconnected in his account. Consequently, to bring the interpretative spaces 
constructed in journalism to light is to begin to discuss an important aspect of its 
ethics. 
 
Of particular value to journalism ethics is the idea of good or true interpretation. 
Unlike Habermas, who looks to pragmatics to help him identify conditions for quality 
public debate, Gadamer avoids what he sees as techniques of truth-telling. Grondin 
(2003) spends considerable time in his analysis of Gadamer arguing that what is 
envisaged is a state of being in truth rather than a way of knowing truth. Without 
reducing the approach to a method, some points can be made, however, about how 
this state emerges. I discuss these in more detail elsewhere (Matheson 2004), but in 
outline Gadamer asks interpreters to listen and to be ‘vigilant’. Listening – as aspect 
of journalism practice which again is rarely investigated – stands as the polar opposite 
of what Ricoeur (1970) termed the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’, where a critical 
agenda drives interpretation. That is, listening directs us to consider, as noted above, 
that the other may be right. Vigilance entails a ‘confrontation with ourselves’ 
(Grondin 2003: 49), so that we hold in mind the preconceptions through which 
understanding begins. Edgar uses hermeneutic theory to propose that the journalist’s 
interpretation of reality ‘must remain genuinely open to the questions that other actors 
can pose to it’ (1992: 128).  
 
Gadamer’s point goes further, however. Understanding, as a linguistic action in a here 
and now, is always going to belong to that instance of being. There is no simple 
progression towards better understanding through repetitions of the hermeneutic 
circle. Instead, he wants to recognise the limits of our capacities and to acknowledge 
the value of always trying anew. There is then an appreciation of limitation, of a 
humility, in understanding. He would not only want journalists to reflect on their own 
prejudgements, but also ask them to qualify what they know, making clear the 
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temporality and the situatedness of their knowledge, all the while continuing to hold 
tight to a desire to grasp the object in its wholeness. 
 
Concluding thoughts 
There is no space here to discuss critiques of Gadamer or his dialogues with other 
contemporary theorists other than to briefly qualify the points I have made. 
Gadamer’s thinking provides, firstly, no grand theory of public debate. Instead, like 
many language philosophers, he begins from the interpersonal, as well as from the 
experience of art or God. Practices such as journalism which speak for those whom 
they also speak to do not always fit neatly within philosophical hermeneutics – the 
question of how individuals, publics, journalists and those represented in the news are 
all at play in the moment of the news is difficult to resolve. Gadamer also has little to 
say on one of the most important questions around public debate – the role of power. 
Ricoeur, for example, argues for the need to balance the kind of hermeneutics of 
respect for the other which Gadamer outlines, with a more critical hermeneutics of 
suspicion (Cefaï & Munoz-Dardé 1999). Habermas finds in Gadamer’s writings only 
a weak critique of the forces of dominance which organise the objects of 
understanding. Particularly in a contemporary cultural context where horizons are 
being fused in western capitalism’s global expansion, we might want to value 
difference and acts of resistance more strongly (see Pickering 1997: 156-7). 
 
However, there is much here of value to journalism studies. Gadamer provides ways 
of talking about – and thereby opening up for study – aspects of the practice which 
eludes more epistemologically concerned theories. Journalistic nous, such as the 
knowledge embedded in Tim Franks’ use of significant detail to illuminate a political 
issue, discussed above, need not be seen as inadequate or pre-theoretical knowledge, 
but as part of the horizon which is shared within a certain journalistic community 
allowing them to see material as possible news. Similarly, the news judgement here, 
which Franks might well struggle to articulate except in terms of a ‘powerful story’, 
can be valued precisely for its holism, which allows the details of the al-Kuwaiti 
family to remain details, and not be reduced to instances of a bigger story. Work on 
the phenomenology of broadcasting (e.g. Scannell 1996) can be connected with 
analysis of how journalists open up interpretative spaces at moments such as this, 
where the BBC’s listeners could feel some of the fraught identity of Israel. 
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Conversely, the journalistic concern for truth can be disconnected from unrealistic 
notions of objectivity, valuing the correspondent’s attempt to encounter the true 
experience of the people in the story. Running through all these points is an ethical 
agenda, providing ways to talk about the good and the true in journalism’s 
interpretative work, that is, to judge whether journalists such as Franks are truly 
listening to the other or opening up spaces where horizons of understanding may meet 
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